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Abstract
While research demonstrates that opposite action (OA) impacts emotion (Rizvi & Linehan,
2005), we lack an understanding of the mechanisms by which it produces opposite emotions. The
current study dismantled emotion regulation skill components by comparing tasks with different
combinations of cognitive, emotive and behavioral components. I predicted that the OA
condition would be the most effective in altering negative emotion. University students (n =
194) completed a sadness induction and were randomly assigned to either a (1) control, (2) low
arousal positive imagery (3) high arousal positive imagery, or (4) OA plus high arousal positive
imagery condition. The control condition experienced the smallest changes in emotion in the
predicted directions across most emotion outcomes, followed by the low arousal positive
imagery condition and last, the OA and high arousal positive imagery conditions, which did not
tend to differ from each other. Using opposite emotion (valence and arousal) was effective in
changing sadness; however, the behavioral component did not change emotion above and
beyond the cognitive and emotive components tested. Study conditions were not different in the
time they spent persisting on a distressing task. The behavioral component of OA might not be
important for emotion change; however, it seems likely that self-reported levels of discomfort
and vividness in mental imagery experienced by the OA condition hindered the effectiveness of
the behavioral component. This finding could shed light on the importance of building
therapeutic rapport to increase comfortability engaging in OA prior to introducing it in
psychotherapy.
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Introduction
Carlos is having difficulties pursuing his long-term career goals due to severe bouts of
sadness that trigger crying spells and days spent in his bed. After years of unsuccessful attempts
to cope with these symptoms on his own and an increase in distress following a recent break-up,
he calls a psychological clinic to help him reach his goals. His therapist, Charli, turns to
Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993) in search for a skill that would be effective
for Carlos. Charli searches for empirical evidence supporting a skill called “opposite to emotion
action,” a commonly used skill for changing strong negative emotions. However, she is
disappointed to find very little empirical support. Although clinicians have a wide variety of
strategies at their disposal, there is not sufficient research to decipher which skills work in
changing unhelpful emotional experiences.
Opposite to emotion action (hereinafter, “opposite action”) is an emotion regulation skill.
The user of this skill carries out an action that is associated with an opposing emotional
experience (Linehan, 2015). In using opposite action, individuals are asked to first identify their
current emotional state, then to identify their natural action tendencies triggered by this emotion,
and finally, to determine and engage in the opposite physical actions associated with the natural
tendencies (Rizvi & Linehan, 2005). For example, when Carlos feels especially sad, his body
gets heavier and he tends to sink into his couch, weep and withdraw from whatever he is doing.
Charli has asked him to use opposite action when this happens, by identifying his current
emotional state (sadness) and the associated action tendencies (staying home, slumping down
into his couch in a contractive posture, avoiding company and crying). He would then identify
the emotional experience that is opposite to sadness (happiness) and the action tendencies
associated with happiness (be around others, get active, smile, laugh) and engage in those
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behaviors. Note however that opposite action does not include the denial or suppression of
emotion. Opposite action directs its users to acknowledge their emotional experience and to
acknowledge the actions they want to take but to choose to act in the opposite manner anyway.
To understand if opposite action is effective, there are several questions to be addressed.
First, how does one determine the emotion the opposite action should be associated with? What
does it mean to be “opposite” to a given emotion? Second, are the physical movements involved
in the opposite action responsible for key changes in emotion? Or alternatively, third, is simply
the use of opposite emotion effective in altering emotional experience? Is the action piece
necessary? And are changes in emotion as a function of the components of the task predictive of
persistence on an emotional task requiring self-control?
What is Opposite Emotion?
Among the variety of existing emotion conceptualizations, Russell’s (2003) core affect
model plots emotions along two dimensions (valence and arousal), where the basic emotions
tend to form a circle. See Figure 1. Within this framework, each emotion has a corresponding
opposite emotion, which is opposite in both valence and arousal. For example, Figure 1 shows
that excitement, which is high in both valence and arousal, corresponds with the opposite feeling
of sluggishness, a low valence and arousal emotion. To the contrary, nervousness (low valence,
high arousal) corresponds with an opposite feeling of relaxation (high valence, low arousal).
Previous research suggests that using opposite valence significantly changes emotion when using
skills such as positive imagery (Holmes, Mathews, Dalgleish, & Mackintosh, 2006), exposure
therapy (Barlow, 1988), behavioral activation (Lejuez, Hopko, LePage, Hopko, & McNeil, 2001)
and incongruent attention allocation (Schwager & Rothermund, 2014), however less research
examines the effects of using opposite arousal to change emotion. Viewing emotion through the
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lens of the core affect model, I ask whether using both opposite valence and arousal increases
emotion change (increases in positive or pleasant emotions, decreases in negative affect, and
increases in subjective physiological arousal) above and beyond using valence alone.
Action Tendencies
Opposite action requires that its users identify action tendencies (i.e. conditioned
behavioral patterns; Chambers, Gullone, & Allen, 2009) associated with their current emotions
as well as those associated with an emotion that is opposite to their current experience. Each
emotion that we experience is associated with urges to carry out specific actions (Frijda, 2010;
Wiers, Reinout, Rinck, Kordts, 2010), which may lead to behaviors such as running away from a
tiger when scared or yelling at someone when angry. Happiness brings an urge to approach an
object or situation. When feelings of happiness are triggered, some associated natural action
tendencies are laughing, smiling, initiating eye-contact, dancing, and expanding into an opened
posture. On the other hand, natural action tendencies associated with sadness are isolation and
avoidance of social interaction (Yadegarfard, Meinhold-Bergmann, & Ho, 2014; Rizvi &
Linehan, 2005) as well as frowning, maintaining an enclosed or contractive posture, and
avoiding eye contact.
In fact, theories supporting opposite action rely on the concept of action tendency.
Specifically, previous research suggests that there may be a bidirectional causal relationship
between emotions and their action tendencies such that emotions trigger action tendencies as
well as enhance our emotional experience or prompt new emotions (Barlow, 1988; Linehan,
2015). This conceptualization suggests that someone can interrupt an emotional cycle and
reverse it by engaging in a behavior that opposes the natural action tendency (opposite to
emotion action; Linehan, 1993). When reversing the cycle in this way, the associated opposite

4
action theoretically blocks the natural tendency and a new relationship between action and
emotion is developed and strengthened.
As evidence for the idea that actions can cause emotion, recent work on “Power Posing”
supports the theory behind opposite action (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2010; Carney, Cuddy, &
Yap, 2015; Dimberg & Soderkvist, 2011). In one study, individuals were instructed to hold one
of two postures for two minutes - an open and expansive posture associated with power (i.e. the
power posing posture) or a closed and contractive posture associated with powerlessness (Carney
et al., 2010). Results of this indicated that the power posing posture caused neuroendocrine and
behavioral changes consistent with power (increases in testosterone, decreases in cortisol, and
increased feelings of power and tolerance for risk), whereas those instructed to hold the posture
associated with powerlessness triggered the opposite effect - feelings of powerlessness (N = 42).
A recent meta-analysis (Carney, Cuddy, & Yap, 2015) analyzed 33 studies examining the effects
of power-posing and found that subjective feelings of power were higher for those adopting
expansive, powerful postures in comparison to those adopting contractive, powerless postures in
all of the studies. However, they did not find consistent evidence for neuroendocrine differences
between the groups. This suggests that if power-posing does cause changes in emotion, it
influences subjective feelings. Simmons and Simonsohn (2017) conducted a selective reporting
p-curve analysis on all 33 studies to correct for selective reporting and concluded that the current
empirical data is too weak to suggest that people should engage in power-posing to improve their
lives; however, Carney et al. (2015) posit that there may be certain circumstances in which the
effects of power-posing are more robust, suggest that the hypothesis should still be explored.
The Facial Feedback Hypothesis (Strack, Miller, & Stepper, 1988) also supports the idea
that behaviors associated with a desired emotion can shift emotions in that direction. The Facial
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Feedback Hypothesis proposes that facial expressions (e.g. smiles and frowns) can initiate the
respective associated emotions (e.g. happiness and sadness). For example, in one study,
participants were instructed to lift their cheeks (smile condition) or contract their eyebrows
(frown condition) when exposed to positive stimuli (happy faces or flowers) and negative stimuli
(angry faces or snakes; Dimberg & Soderkvist, 2011). Results of this study indicate that
participants in the smile condition rated pictures as more pleasant and as less unpleasant than
those in the frown condition. In fact, the participant ratings did not change even after a time
period of 4 minutes lapsed from the action. This result pattern suggests that these non-verbal
displays do indeed interrupt the cycle between emotion and action. In theory and based on this
evidence, engaging in an action tendency linked to one’s opposite emotion should weaken the
vicious cycle between the undesired emotion and the action tendency. Of note, the findings of
the original study in support of the Facial Feedback Hypothesis (Strack et al., 1988) failed to be
replicated (Wagenmakers, Beek, Dijkhoff, & Gronau, in press), however there are indications
that the hypothesis should still be explored. For example, a stronger manipulation than the one
used by Strack and his colleagues may have shown significant change in emotion. Also, it may
be that there are important moderators, such as attention to emotion that influence the effects of
the manipulation (Dzokoto, Wallace, Peters, & Bentsi-Enchill, 2014).
Positive Imagery: A Cognitive Process
Opposite action theoretically uses both action and emotion to modify emotional
experiences. The outline of findings above begs the following questions: are the physical
movements involved in the opposite action responsible for key changes in emotion? Or is it just
the use of opposite emotion a more effective pathway leading to the opposite experience? And if
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the emotional component is critical, is using an emotion that is opposite in both valence and
arousal (as defined by Russell’s 2-dimensional model) more efficient than using valence alone?
The behavioral component of opposite action distinguishes this skill from other methods
that change emotion, such as those changing emotion via cognitive processes. For example,
positive mental imagery is another method of eliciting emotion, consisting of a cognitive but not
a behavioral component. Mental imagery is a mental activity naturally practiced by most people
on a daily basis (Holmes et al., 2006) that can maintain, enhance or change one’s current
emotional experience. Mental imagery is a cognitive process (conceptualized as thoughts by the
elaborated intrusion theory of desire; May, Kavanagh, & Andrade, 2015) that can be defined as
an indirect experience of any type of sensory information (sound, sight, touch, taste or smell)
when the direct sensory stimulation does not exist (Pictet & Holmes, 2013). Although mental
imagery is not inherently an emotion regulation strategy, it can be harnessed in treatment (e.g.
imaginal exposure as used in CBT) to promote and enhance specific emotional experiences. This
mental process is able to produce emotion change through a strong connection to the amygdala
and prefrontal cortex, which become activated while engaging in imagery (Decety, 1996;
Frewen, Dozois, Neufeld, Lane, Densmore, Stevens & Lanius, 2010).
There is a long history of research showing the powerful impact of mental imagery on
emotion change (Holmes, Lang, Moulds, & Steele, 2008; Holmes, Lang, & Shah, 2009; Holmes
& Mathews, 2010; Holmes et al., 2006; Zikmund, 1972) and on a broad variety of mental
illnesses (e.g. phobias, depression, generalized anxiety disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder,
obsessive-compulsive disorder, stuttering, acute and chronic pain; Pictet & Holmes, 2013;
Fernald, 1912). Holmes and colleagues (2009) used a cognitive bias modification for
interpretation (CBM-I) task, to show that positive imagery increased positive emotion more than

7
verbalizing the same positive situation. This evidence supports the idea that imagery is an
emotionally evocative tool to increase positive emotion and decrease negative emotion.
Comparing the emotion change elicited by opposite action to that of imagery would allow
us to learn whether the action component of opposite action adds anything to other (e.g.,
cognitive) methods of emotion elicitation.
Are Both Valence and Arousal Important for Emotion Change?
Past work shows that positive and negative imagery are effective at changing emotion,
but we are lacking an understanding of the comparative effects of valence and arousal. We know
that valence of imagery is important, as previous studies show positive imagery is more effective
than neutral or negative imagery in increasing tolerance to discomfort (Remer, Watson, &
Brinly, 1978), in increasing motor performance (Woolfolk, Parrish, & Murphy, 1985), and in
changing emotion (Holmes et al., 2006). However, less is known about the impact of the arousal
of emotive imagery. If it is truly opposite emotion (as defined by Russell’s 2-dimensional model)
that is at the heart of opposite action, then using an emotion that is associated with the opposite
level of arousal should be more effective in changing emotion than merely an emotion different
in valence.
Effects of Emotion Change on Goal-Directed Behavior
We also know that emotion regulation impacts goal-directed behavior and self-regulatory
efforts (Baumeister, Heatherton & Tice, 1994). Difficulties regulating emotions seen in a variety
of disorders has been linked to functional impairment, whereas emotion regulation abilities have
been associated with greater achievement (Mennin & Farach, 2007). More specifically, certain
emotional experiences seem to mitigate efforts towards accomplishing goals, while others can
help cultivate self-regulation and goal-directed behavior (Ratneshwar, Mick & Huffman, 2003).
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Tamir (2016) reviewed several studies suggesting that people regulate their emotions in ways
that will facilitate goal achievement, even when doing so means they will need to experience
unpleasant emotions. For example, participants who were asked to play an aggressive game were
motivated to experience unpleasant feelings of anger to facilitate their performance (Tamir,
Mitchell, & Gross, 2008). In addition, certain emotional experiences have been linked to greater
efforts on tasks requiring self-regulation. For example, strong negative affect may lead to
disengagement from goal directed behavior (Carver, Lawrence & Scheier, 1996). One study
found that the use of adaptive emotion regulation strategies improved motor performance
(quicker reaction time and improved performance accuracy) in comparison to maladaptive
emotion regulation strategies (Beatty Fawver, Hancock, & Janelle, 2014); however we don’t
know whether these differences in goal-directed behavior are a function of emotion change or
whether these effects would be seen in other types of goal-directed behavior, specifically and
emotion-oriented task requiring self-regulation.
Based on theory and previous research analyzing the role of emotion in pursuing goals, it
would make sense that greater increases in positive emotion and decreases in negative emotion
(such as should be created via the components of opposite action) would positively influence
goal-directed behavior and self-regulatory efforts. Understanding the influence of changes in
positive and negative affect as a function of opposite action components on goal-pursuit may
elucidate helpful targets to improve deficits in self-regulation for those who need it most.
Current Study
The present study tested the effectiveness of opposite action in changing momentary
emotion (increasing subjective valence, arousal, and joviality, while decreasing subjective
sadness) as well as the effects of emotion change resulting from opposite action components on
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goal-directed behavior. To do this, I compared the effectiveness of a combination of cognitive,
emotive and behavioral mechanisms together (opposite action) against that of cognitive and
emotive mechanisms (positive imagery) and cognitive components alone (neutral imagery;
control condition) in interfering with unwanted emotions (sadness). In addition, there were two
positive imagery conditions, one using imagery scenarios that elicit high arousal positive
emotions and one eliciting low arousal positive emotions, allowing us to understand whether
arousal is an important component for changing emotion. I predicted that those in the three
emotion regulation task conditions would experience greater reductions in subjective sadness and
increases in subjective valence, arousal and joviality than the control condition, which does not
contain cognitive, behavioral or emotive mechanisms. In addition, it would make sense that the
high arousal positive imagery condition and the opposite action plus imagery condition (which
used the high arousal scenarios) would experience greater increases in subjective arousal and
joviality and decreases in sadness than those in the low arousal positive imagery condition,
because the level of arousal that is opposite to the arousal associated with sadness (the
anticipated emotional experience at the time of 4 tasks) were induced. I also hypothesized that
those in the opposite action (behavioral action plus positive cognitive imagery) condition would
experience the greatest reduction in subjective sadness and increase in subjective valence,
arousal, and joviality in comparison to the high arousal positive imagery condition because
opposite action included a behavioral component to exacerbate the effects of the cognitive and
emotive mechanisms. Lastly, I predict that goal-directed behavior would improve as a function
of emotion change, such that greater decreases in sadness and increases in valence as a result of
each opposite action component would be associated with better performance on a task requiring
self-regulation.

10
Method
Power Analysis
Rizvi, Dimeff, Skutch, Carroll, and Linehan (2011) found a significant decrease in
depression symptoms, as measured by the Beck-Depression Inventory after 10 to 14 days of
opposite action treatment, t(21) = 2.69, p = .014, d = .55. This effect size of .55 was then
converted into a cohen’s f of .28. G*Power 3.1 software was utilized in order to conduct a power
analysis for a one-way, fixed effects ANOVA, in the F tests family. The analysis determined that
144 participants were necessary in order to obtain an effect size of .28, with an alpha level of .05,
power of .8, for this 4 groups design. To compensate for missing and invalid data, 194
participants were recruited.
Participants
One-hundred ninety-four male and female undergraduates of the University of Arkansas
participated in the study, receiving course credit in an introductory psychology course.
Participants with high levels of emotional reactivity in comparison to their peers were recruited
in efforts to 1) increase the intensity and duration of emotional reactions to the sadness induction
and 2) recruit people similar to those that opposite action was designed to treat (e.g. people with
difficulties regulating emotions). Those with high levels of emotional reactivity are shown to be
more sensitive to emotional stimuli, demonstrating stronger emotional reactions to a broader
range of emotional stimuli that last a longer period of time (Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley,
2008). All students in the University of Arkansas psychology subject pool had an opportunity to
complete the department pre-screener, which included the Emotional Reactivity Scale (ERS;
Nock et al, 2008). Previous work with college populations has typically used a cut-off Emotional
Reactivity Scale total score of 30, with healthy controls demonstrating a mean composite ERS

11
score of 25 and those with a borderline personality disorder diagnosis with a mean composite
score of 30 (Nock et al., 2008; Kuo, Fitzpatrick, Metcalfe, & McMain, 2016). In light of these
findings, those scoring at or above a 30 were invited to participate in the study.
Measures
Individual Difference Measures.
Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21. The Depression Anxiety Stress Scale-21 (DASS-21;
Henry & Crawford, 2005) is a 21-item self-report measure that assesses depression, anxiety and
overall psychological distress in the past week, using a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0
(did not apply to me at all) to 3 (applied to me very much or most of the time). This version of
the scale is shortened from the original 42-item Depression Anxiety Stress Scale (DASS;
Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS-21 demonstrated strong internal consistencies for the
Depression (α = .87), Anxiety (α = .77), and Stress (α = .81) subscales and the Total
(psychological distress) scale (α = .92).
Short Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale. The Short Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (SDERS; Bjureberg, Ljotsson, Tull, Hedman, Sahlin, Lundh, Bjarehed, DiLillo,
Messman-Moore, Gumpert & Gratz, 2016) is a 16-item self-report measure consisting of six
subscales assessing emotional clarity, limited access to emotion regulation strategies, lack of
awareness, impulse control difficulties, difficulties engaging in goal-directed behavior, and nonacceptance of emotional responses. The DERS uses a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from
1(Almost Never) to 5 (Almost Always). Higher scores indicate more problems regulating
emotions. The current study supports previous work suggesting that the measure has strong
internal consistency (α = .85 for the Total scale)
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Emotional Reactivity Scale. The Emotional Reactivity Scale (Nock et al., 2008) was
used to measure the degree to which an individual is emotionally reactive for recruitment
purposes. The 21-item scale consists of 3 components, assessing sensitivity (ease to which
emotions are provoked; 8 items), arousal (the intensity of emotional experiences; 10 items), and
persistence (the duration of emotional experiences before returning to baseline). The scale
demonstrated strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .89) among all 21 items.
PANAS. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, &
Tellegen, 1988) was used to measure individuals’ tendency toward experiencing positive and
negative affect. The measure was adapted to indicate levels of positive and negative affect
experienced over the past few weeks, using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (slightly or not at
all) to 5 (extremely). Both the Positive Affect (Cronbach’s α = .89) and Negative Affect
(Cronbach’s α = .86) subscales demonstrate strong internal consistency in the current study.
State Emotion Measures.
Affect Grid. The present-moment affect grid (Russell, Weiss, & Mendelson, 1989) was
used to quickly assess pleasure and arousal. This single item measure asked participants to
indicate their present mood by marking one box on the grid, which provides separate pleasure
and arousal scores on 9-point scales. Russell et al. (1989) asked participants to rate emotion
words, facial expressions and mood in 3 different studies to obtain pleasure and arousal scores
which demonstrated strong convergent and divergent validity.
PANAS-X Subscales. Five PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) subscales were used to
measure the degree to which participants felt sad (sad, blue, downhearted, alone, lonely; 5 items;
associated with low valence and arousal), jovial (happy, joyful, delighted, cheerful, excited,
enthusiastic, lively, energetic; 8 items; associated with high valence and arousal), serene (calm,
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relaxed, at ease; 3 items; associated with high valence and low arousal), hostile (angry, hostile,
irritable, scornful, disgusted, loathing; 6 items; associated with low valence and high arousal),
and fearful (afraid, scared, frightened, nervous, jittery, shaky; 6 items; associated with low
valence and high arousal) in the present moment, using an 8-point likert scale, ranging from 0
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). These particular emotions were chosen because measuring emotions
with distinct levels of valence and arousal allowed us to understand the impact of each emotion
regulation task on emotions associated with different combinations of valence and arousal.
Across study time-points, the sadness (range for α= .77 - .85), joviality (range for α= .92 - .96;
range = .88 to .94), serenity (range for α= .85 - .88), hostility (range for α= .75 - .88), and fear
(range for α= .65 - .83) subscales demonstrate good to excellent internal consistency (except for
fear at baseline) in the current study, which is similar in prior work (Watson & Clark, 1999).
Alphas were lowest at baseline where participants demonstrated less variability in emotions.
Self-Regulation Measure.
Mirror Tracing Persistence Task. To measure goal-directed behavior (time spent
persisting on a task that requires self-regulation to work towards a goal) participants completed a
revised version of the Mirror Tracing Persistence Task (MTPT; Strong, Lejuez, Daughters,
Marinello, Kahler, & Brown, 2003). They were given the goal to trace a star using a computer
mouse without going outside of the star’s outline on 4 different trials (1 low-difficulty, 1 medium
difficulty, and 2 high-difficulty trials). The cursor moved in the opposite direction than the
movement of the mouse; moving the mouse to the left caused the cursor to move to the right and
moving it up caused the cursor to move downwards. When the cursor moved outside of the star’s
outline or was stalled for more than 2 seconds an obnoxiously loud buzzer sounded, and the
participant had to start again from the beginning of the star. The thickness of the line being
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traced will became thinner and thinner as participants move through the trials, making it more
and more difficult to keep the cursor in the outline. The 4th trial was the key trial, because
participants were given the option to quit; the amount of time until the participant quit was the
central measure of distress tolerance in this task. Of note, the task ended after 5 minutes when
participants did not choose to forfeit.
This task has received support for convergent validity as it has been shown to be
correlated with another behavioral task designed to measure distress tolerance (Paced Auditory
Serial Addition Task; Lejuez, Kahler, & Brown, 2003). This task has also received support for
construct validity as it has demonstrated that it reliably induces distress (Bornovalova et al.,
2008; Lejuez et al., 2003).
Emotion Regulation Task Manipulation Checks. At the end of each session all
participants were asked questions to understand the degree to which they implemented the task.
Each group was asked to rate their assigned task on a 5-point Likert-type scale, indicating how
pleasant they experienced each portion the task to be (each scenario or portion of the day written
about), how vivid their mental images were, and how engaged they were in the task, ranging
from 1 (extremely unpleasant [not vivid at all] completely disengaged) to 5 (extremely pleasant
[extremely vivid] completely engaged). They were also be asked, whether they maintained
imagery and carried out the task at hand for the duration of the task (yes or no) and how
comfortable they were in completing the task, ranging from 1 (extremely uncomfortable) to 5
(extremely comfortable).
Procedure
The University Institutional Review Board approved study procedures. Upon arrival to
their individual session, the subjects read and signed the study’s consent form. Following
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consent, each participant was asked to act out a scenario described by the experimenter to 1)
promote comfortability and engagement in the opposite action task completed by those in the
opposite action plus positive imagery condition and 2) expedite the process of giving instructions
for this task after an emotion induction (which is a time-sensitive time-point during the study).
Participants listened to a recording, while acting out the overt behaviors italicized below.
“You’ve just arrived home after staying late at work, you open the refrigerator, looking
for something to eat. You grab the carton of milk, sandwich bread and cheese and lunch
meat package. Then you open up the cupboard and grab a cup and plate. You twist off
the lid of the milk, fill the glass with milk and open the packages of bread, cheese and
meat. Next you place the cheese and turkey on the bread. You proceed to drink the milk
and eat the sandwich while standing at the counter. It’s late, so you make your way to
the bathroom where you begin to brush your teeth. After you brush your teeth, you wash
your face. You slip into you’re overstuffed chair, sinking down into the chair like a rock.
You pick up the book on the end table next to you. You read, relaxing before going to
bed, turning the page every few minutes.”
As a cover story, participants were told that our bodies and are minds are connected and
this task will allow us to learn how arbitrary physical movements influence our physiology.
Following this task, participants were provided blood oxygen levels using a fingertip pulse
oximeter to support the cover story. Next, participants completed measures of depression and
anxiety (DASS-21; Henry & Crawford, 2005), emotion dysregulation (DERS; Gratz & Roemer,
2004), distress tolerance (DTS; Simons & Gaher, 2005), and tendency towards experiencing
positive and negative affect (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) to control for the effects of these
constructs on participants’ changes in emotion. Following this, participants used the Affect Grid
(Russell et al., 1989) and the selected PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) subscales to indicate
their present emotional experience.
As a sadness induction, each participant then viewed 3 consecutive movie clips from “My
Girl” (Grazer, Caracciolo, Friendly, & Zieff, 1991), “The Lion King” (Hahn, Minkoff, & Allers,
1994) and “The Champ” (Lovell & Zeffirelli, 1979), which have been shown to successfully
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induce negative emotions (Gotlib, Traill, Montoya, Joormann, & Chang, 2005; Gross &
Levenson,1995). To keep experimenters blind from the participant’s condition up to this point,
experimenters randomly assigned the participant to one of 4 conditions during the induction.
Following the sadness induction, participants completed the Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989)
and PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) for a 2nd time. Next, participants completed the emotion
regulation task they were randomly assigned to: either an opposite action plus positive imagery,
high arousal positive imagery, low arousal positive imagery, or control condition (these tasks are
described further in the next section). Following these tasks, all participants completed the
PANAS-X (Watson & Clark, 1999) and the Affect Grid (Russell et al., 1989) for the 3rd time.
Then participants were given instructions for completing the mirror tracing persistence task
(MTPT; Strong et al., 2003) and completed the task independently. After the MTPT (Strong et
al., 2003), all participants completed the state emotion measures (Affect Grid; Russell et al.,
1989; PANAS-X; Watson & Clark, 1999) for the 4th and final time. Following this, all
participants were asked the questions in the “Emotion Regulation Task Manipulation Check”
section above. Finally, participants were fully debriefed. After each session, participants were
granted 1 research credit to compensate them for their time. See Figure 2 for an overview of the
study timeline.
Control Condition. Participants assigned to the control condition received instructions to
listen to and imagine 3 emotionally neutral imagery scenarios. These individuals imagined
neutral scenarios that were recorded in the 1st person perspective, (previous research has
demonstrated more robust effects with the use of 1st person in comparison to 3rd person in
positive imagery; Holmes, Blackwell Raes, Renner & Raes, 2016). Participants in each condition
were presented with the recorded scenarios via a computer using speakers, with recordings of the
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positive events read in a female voice (clips last approximately 1 minute each). See Table 1 for
examples.
Low arousal positive imagery task. Participants assigned to the low arousal positive
imagery condition received instructions to listen to descriptions of 3 imagery scenarios
associated with low arousal, positive emotions (contentment/serenity), while imagining each
recording. These individuals imagined positive low arousal scenarios. See Table 1 for examples.
High arousal positive imagery task. 40 participants assigned to the high arousal
positive imagery condition received instructions to listen to descriptions of 3 imagery scenarios
associated with high arousal, positive emotions, while imagining each recording. These
individuals then imagined positive high arousal scenarios, which were recorded in the 1st person
perspective similar to the low arousal positive condition except designed to elicit excitement
(high arousal). See Table 1 for examples.
Opposite action plus positive imagery task: Procedure and materials. Participants
assigned to the opposite action plus positive imagery condition received instructions to complete
an opposite action task, while imagining the same 3 scenarios used in the high arousal imagery
condition. Participants in this condition were instructed to imagine and act out the parts of each
scenario that refer to overt behavior (the italicized words in the example below [e.g. such as
sitting upright on the edge of their seat in anticipation and jumping up and down, while waving
their hands back and forth]).
“You bought 10 tickets for the power-ball lottery with high hopes of winning $1,000,000.
Drawing day has arrived and you are sitting in front of the TV beside your best friend.
You are sitting on the edge of your seat excitedly waiting for the last number to be called.
The first 4 numbers have been called out and they match with your lottery ticket. You
smile and sit-up even higher in your seat. The last number is called and it matches your
ticket! You begin jumping up and down. You continue jumping, waving your ticket back
and forth. Your best friend joins in, excitedly waving her ticket back and forth, while
jumping up and down.”
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Results
Emotion Induction: Did it Cause Changes in Emotion?
Changes in valence and arousal. To understand effects of the emotion induction on
emotional valence and arousal, I conducted two by four mixed factor ANOVAs, with time
(baseline and pre-regulation task) as the within subjects factor and condition (control, PA-Low,
PA-High and Opposite Action) as the between subjects factor. Although randomization to
condition did not occur until after the induction, the function of including condition in these
analyses was to confirm that conditions did not differ in their emotional responses to the
induction. As predicted, the emotion induction caused significant changes in Valence, F(1, 167)
= 315.64, p < .001, and Arousal, F(1, 167) = 12.47, p = .001, such that both Valence (MT1 =
5.80, SD T1 = 1.86; MT2 = 3.07, SD T2 = 1.46) and Arousal (M T1 = 4.60, SD T1 = 1.71; MT2 = 4.08,
SD T2 = 1.60) decreased following the induction (see Figure 3). Because emotional experiences
prior to the emotion regulation task likely play an important role in the effects of the emotion
regulation task, it is important to understand whether there were differences in emotion across
groups prior to the regulation task. Lack of differences in emotional valence and arousal
following the induction would suggest that people were successfully randomly assigned to
groups on these factors. As expected, there were not time by condition interactions for either
Valence, F(3, 167) = 1.74, p = .16, or Arousal, F(3, 167) = .40, p = .78, suggesting that
emotional valence and arousal after the induction were not different across groups and that
randomization was successful.
Changes in specific emotions. To learn whether the emotion induction produced
changes in specific emotions and to ensure that there were no differences in emotion based on
randomization to groups, five additional two (time) X four (condition) mixed factor ANOVAs
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were conducted. The emotion induction caused significant changes in Joviality, F(1, 168) =
331.87, p < .001], Serenity [F(1, 168) = 206.37, p < .001], Fear [F(1, 168) = 6.13, p = .01],
Hostility [F(1, 168) = 53.11, p < .001] and Sadness [F(1, 168) = 254.68, p < .001]. Specifically,
Joviality (MT1 = 2.38, SD T1 = .89; MT2 = 1.37, SD T2 = .50) and Serenity (MT1 = 3.54, SD T1 =
1.03; MT2 = 2.41, SD T2 = .97) decreased and Fear (MT1 = 1.38, SD T1 = .43; MT2 = 1.48, SD T2 =
.58) Hostility (MT1 = 1.20, SD T1 = .37; MT2 = 1.49, SD T2 = .60) and Sadness (M T1 = 1.58, SD T1 =
.78; MT2 = 2.57, SD T2 = .80) increased following the induction (pre-regulation task; see Figure
2). There were not time by condition interactions for Joviality [F(3, 168) = 1.48, p = .22],
Serenity [F(3, 168) = .39, p = .78], Fear [F(3, 168) = 1.89, p = .13], Hostility [F(3, 168) = 1.00, p
= .40] or Sadness [F(3, 168) = .33, p = .81], further suggesting that each condition experienced
similar changes in emotion due to the emotion induction. See Figure 4 for pre- to post-induction
changes in specific emotions.
Differences in Emotion Post-Emotion Regulation Tasks
Valence and arousal. To understand whether the emotion regulation tasks produced
changes in emotional valence and arousal and to understand relative differences across
conditions, two, time (pre- and post-emotion regulation task) by condition ANOVAs were
conducted. Because the prior analyses confirmed that there were no differences in emotion
following the induction (i.e., pre-regulation task), follow-up tests for significant interactions
were conducted by comparing groups on emotional level following the emotion regulation task.
This approach to follow-up testing allowed us to determine whether there were differences in
post-regulation task emotion (in these cases, valence and arousal) to demonstrate whether
emotional changes produced by the various emotion regulation tasks were different across
groups.
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Valence. A main effect for time was found for Valence [F(1, 167) = 530.60, p < .001, η2p
= .76], such that Valence (MT2 = 3.07, SD = 1.46; MT3 = 6.90, SD = 1.62) increased after
completing the emotion regulation tasks. There was also an interaction between condition and
time for Valence, F(3, 167) = 3.18, p = .03, η2p = .05. Post-hoc tests comparing conditions for
valence after the emotion regulation task revealed that the PA-High and PA-Low conditions
experienced higher emotional valence post-regulation task than the control and the OA
conditions. The control and OA conditions did not differ post-regulation task nor did the PAhigh and PA-low conditions differ from each other post-regulation task.
Arousal. A main effect for time was also found for Arousal [F(1, 167) = 38.19, p < .001,
η2p = .19], such that Arousal (MT2 = 4.08, SD = 1.60; MT3 = 5.06, SD = 2.12) increased after
completing the emotion regulation tasks. There was an interaction between condition and time
for Arousal, F(3, 167) = 21.82, p < .001, η2p = .28. Specifically, the PA-High and opposite
action conditions, which did not differ from one another, reported higher arousal following
emotion regulation task than the control and PA-Low conditions, which also did not differ from
one another (see Figure 5).
Specific emotions. To understand whether the emotion regulation tasks produced
changes in specific emotions and whether these changes were different across conditions, five
time (pre- and post-regulation task) by condition ANOVAs were conducted. Significant
interactions were followed up (using Bonferroni post-hoc tests) by looking at differences in postregulation task emotions across conditions, because there were no differences in emotions prior
to the task.
Joviality. A main effect for time was found for Joviality [F(1, 168) = 299.53, p < .001,
η2p = .64], such that Joviality (MT2 = 1.37, SD = .50; MT3 = 2.65, SD = 1.10) increased after
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completing the emotion regulation tasks. There was an interaction between condition and time
for Joviality, F(3, 168) = 11.41, p < .001, η2p = .19. Specifically, Bonferroni post-hoc tests
revealed that those in the PA-high condition had higher joviality post-regulation task than those
in the PA-Low condition, which in turn had higher post-regulation task joviality than the control
condition. Importantly, PA-High and Opposite Action did not differ in post-regulation task
joviality (see Figure 4).
Serenity. A main effect for time was found for Serenity [F(1, 168) = 105.07, p < .001, η2p
= .39]. Serenity (MT2 = 2.41, SD = .97; MT3 = 3.16, SD = 1.13) increased after completing the
emotion regulation tasks. There was an interaction between condition and time for Serenity, F(3,
146) = 28.27, p < .001, η2p = .37. As predicted, those in the PA-Low condition experienced
higher levels of serenity after the regulation task than all 3 other conditions. The control group,
which had the second highest level of serenity, was higher in serenity than the PA-High
condition, which was in turn higher than the opposite action condition (see Figure 4).
Fear. A main effect for time was found for Fear [F(1, 168) = 26.61, p < .001, η2p = .14],
such that Fear (MT2 = 1.48, SD = .58; MT3 = 1.27, SD =.39) decreased after completing the
emotion regulation tasks. There was an interaction between condition and time for Fear, F(3,
146) = 4.29, p = .01, η2p = .08. Following emotion regulation task, the opposite action condition
experienced higher levels of fear than the PA-High condition, followed by the PA-Low and
control conditions; the PA-Low and control conditions did not differ in self-reported postregulation task fear (see Figure 4).
Hostility. A main effect for time was found for Hostility [F(1, 168) = 93.82, p < .001, η2p
= .36], such that Hostility (MT2 = 1.49, SD = .60; MT3 = 1.10, SD = .32) decreased after
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completing the emotion regulation tasks. There was not an interaction between condition and
time for Hostility, F(3, 168) = .58, p = .63, η2p = .01(see Figure 4).
Sadness. A main effect for time was found for Sadness [F(1, 168) = 557.02, p < .001, η2p
= .77], such that Sadness (MT2 = 2.57, SD = .80; MT3 = 1.31, SD = .50) decreased after
completing the emotion regulation tasks (see Figure 4).There was an interaction between
condition and time for Sadness, F(3, 168) = 2.73, p < .05, η2p = .05. Specifically, the control and
PA-Low conditions (which were not different post-regulation task) reported the highest levels of
sadness, followed by the PA-High and OA conditions, which were not different from each other
following the emotion regulation task. (see Figure 6).
Mirror Tracing Task: Do emotions predict persistence on an emotion task requiring selfcontrol?
To understand whether changes in emotion predicted persistence on the mirror task, two
hierarchical regressions were conducted with momentary emotions after the induction (preregulation task) entered in Step one and momentary emotions after using the emotion regulation
tasks (post-regulation task) entered at step two, with persistence on the mirror tracing task as the
outcome variable. Valence and arousal were assessed in the first model, and the specific
emotions in the second model. People who did not quit on the mirror-tracing task (n = 8) were
not included in these analyses because they do not have a score reflecting the time they decided
to quit the task. People who were reportedly disengaged from the emotion regulation task (n =
22) or who experienced technological issues completing the task (n = 7) were also excluded
(final N = 157).
Overall, the model with valence and arousal did not account for a significant amount of
variance in persistence on the mirror tracing task, R2 = .006, F(4, 155) = .21, p = .93.
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The overall model with specific emotions accounted for 18% of the variance in mirror
tracing persistence, F(10, 141) = 2.78, p < .01. For step one, specific emotions after the emotion
induction (pre-regulation task) accounted for 11% of the variance in mirror tracing persistence,
F(5, 136) = 3.51, p < .01. Greater Sadness (B = 25.17, SE = 8.23, p < .01), greater Serenity (B =
16.01, SE = 7.01), p <= .02, and less Hostility B = -33.78, SE = 10.69, p < .01, after the emotion
induction (pre-regulation task) predicted greater persistence on the mirror tracing task. Fear (B =
13.69, SE = 11.56, p = .24, and Joviality (B = -9.28, SE = 13.83, p = .50, were not significant
predictors of mirror tracing performance.
Adding post-regulation task specific emotions to the model did not account for
significantly more variability in persistence on the mirror tracing task, F∆(5, 131) = 1.92, p =
.10, R2∆ = .06.
Even though Step two was not significant overall, it is notable that post-regulation task
Sadness (B = 33.13, SE = 15.52, p = .04, and Serenity (B = -11.66, SE = 5.81, p < .05) were
significant unique predictors of mirror tracing persistence; greater remaining sadness and less
remaining serenity after the regulation task when controlling for specific emotions experienced
after the induction predicted longer mirror tracing persistence. For pre- to post-regulation task
emotions and mirror tracing task correlations and descriptive statistics see Table 2.
Condition differences. To examine if emotion regulation task conditions moderated the
effect of post-regulation task emotion on mirror tracing task persistence, I conducted seven
moderated regressions using the PROCESS macro for SPSS Version 3.0 (Hayes, 2017). When
controlling for other pre- and post-regulation task specific emotions, there was no effect of
condition on MTT persistence for any of the specific emotion or for emotional valence and
arousal. Condition did not interact with Valence, β = 2.52, SE = 3.56, p = .48, Arousal, β = 2.33,
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SE = 2.98, p = .42, Joviality, β = -2.05, SE = 5.23, p = .70, Serenity, β = -8.04, SE = 5.17, p =
.12, Fear, β = -18.95, SE = 15.49, p = .22, Hostility, β = 8.10, SE = 27.80, p = .77 or Sadness, β =
-11.45, SE = 12.67, p = .37.
Secondary Analyses
How did condition influence emotion regulation task experience?
Vividness of mental imagery and comfortability engaging in the emotion regulation
task. I ran two ANOVAs examining whether condition influenced end-of-study ratings of (1)
vividness of mental imagery and (2) comfortability engaging in the emotion regulation task.
Vividness of mental imagery. Differences between conditions were found for vividness
of mental imagery F(3, 170) = 3.75, p = .01, η2 = .06 (see Figure 5). Bonferroni follow-up tests
revealed that the control condition reported lower vividness of mental imagery compared to the
high arousal-PA condition. There were no other differences.
Comfortability engaging in the emotion regulation task. There were also differences
across conditions in end-of-study ratings of comfortability engaging in the regulation task F(3,
170) = 20.95, p < .001, η2 = .27. Participants in the opposite action condition reported lower
comfortability than each of the other three groups, which did not differ from each other. (see
Figure 7)
Do individual differences predict emotion change following the emotion regulation task?
The PROCESS macro for SPSS Version 3.0 (Hayes, 2017) was used to conduct 14
moderated regressions to understand whether depressive symptoms and difficulties regulating
emotions (entered into the model as predictors) interacted with condition (entered as the
moderating variable) to predict post-regulation task emotions (entered as the outcome variable)
when controlling for pre-regulation task emotions (entered as covariates). Contrasts were dummy
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coded with the control condition as the reference variable where the control condition was
compared against the low arousal-PA, high arousal-PA and opposite action conditions
separately. Of note, I wanted a more stringent test against Type 1 error because these are
secondary analyses and due to the number of analyses conducted. Therefore, I only looked at
interactions of p < .004. All statistics for these analyses can be found in Table 3 and a Figure
depicting these results can be found in Figure 8.
There was only one moderated effect from the above analyses, which was an interaction
between depressive symptoms and condition on post-regulation task sadness. The interaction
between depression and condition accounted for 8.7% of the variance in post-regulation task
sadness [R2∆ = .09, F(3, 163) = 9.78, p < .001]., Specifically, the effect of depression on postregulation sadness was significant for the control condition (B = .04, SE = .01, t = 7.35, p <
.001) and the low-arousal positive affect condition, (B = .02, SE = .01, t = 3.07, p < .01), and
stronger for the control condition. Depressive symptoms over the past two weeks did predict
post-regulation sadness for the high arousal-PA (B = .004, SE = .007, p = .52) or the opposite
action (B = .003, SE = .006, p = .68) conditions. Neither depressive symptoms nor difficulties
regulating emotions interacted with condition to predict any other post-regulation task emotions,
where the p-value for the interaction was less than .01.
Discussion
The main purpose of the current study was to test the effectiveness of opposite action in
regulating emotion, specifically sadness. I designed a dismantling study to understand whether
the valence, arousal and behavioral components of opposite action aided people in their
emotional recovery (e.g. decreased sadness and increased joviality, valence and arousal after the
completion of each emotion regulation task) after I induced sadness. Based on the tenants of this
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DBT skill, I predicted that using opposite valence, arousal as well as behaviors opposing natural
action tendencies associated with sadness would each have additive contributions to emotional
recovery. Results suggest that using opposite valence and arousal caused significant decreases in
sadness and increases in joviality, valence and arousal; however, the behaviors I asked people in
the opposite action condition to engage in did not seem to change emotion across these domains
above and beyond using opposite valence and arousal.
Emotion Induction
In the current study I aimed to cause sadness in order to understand the effect of opposite
action components on sadness. Results indicated that our manipulation was successful in doing
so. Because emotions are by definition fleeting, previous studies using emotion inductions have
met challenges designing strong manipulations that cause intense emotions lasting for extended
periods of time (Ellard, Farchione & Barlow, 2012; Phillippot, 1993). Like these studies, I faced
the task of inducing sadness that was enduring enough to last from the end of the induction until
participants were set up to complete the emotion regulation tasks as well as the task of inducing
sadness comparable to sadness warranting the use of opposite to emotion action outside of a
laboratory setting. One reason I believe the induction was successful in meeting these challenges
is because I compiled 3 consecutive video clips shown to induce sadness, rather than using only
one video clip. This is a strength because no study I am aware of has used this strategy to induce
sadness. This may have increased the chances that one or more video clips would resonate with
each participant as well as augmented or built upon sadness evoked by prior video clips. The
sample that was recruited (people who scored 30 or above on the Emotion Reactivity Scale;
Nock et al., 2008) also likely led to stronger emotional reactions to the video clips. Theoretically,
people who have higher levels of Emotion Reactivity and therefore tend to experience strong
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emotions for prolonged periods of time prior to returning to baseline level of arousal and in
response to a wide array of stimuli should experience more intense and enduring emotional
responses to emotion inductions. Using our recruitment strategy was critical for the current
study, without a group of participants scoring low on the Emotion Reactivity Scale I was unable
to compare emotion reactions of people scoring high and low on the scale; Future studies should
address this.
Does Opposite Valence Change Sadness?
Results indicate that using opposite valence significantly changes emotion when people
are feeling sad. Comparing the control condition (which was designed to be neutral in valence)
with the low arousal-PA condition, allowed us to better understand the impact of using opposite
valence in changing sadness. Results showed that the low-arousal PA condition experienced
greater emotional valence, joviality and serenity (all positively valenced) than the control
condition following the completion of their respective emotion regulation tasks, which is
consistent with previous research suggesting that using opposite valence is effective in changing
emotion (Holmes & Mathews, 2005; Lane, Chua & Dolan, 1999). Additionally, post-regulation
task of fear, hostility and sadness (all negatively valenced emotions) and arousal were not
different for the control and low arousal-PA conditions.
Does Opposite Arousal Change Sadness?
Results to the current study also suggest that using opposite arousal changes sadness. By
comparing the high and low arousal positive affect conditions I was able to understand the
additive affects of using opposite arousal to change emotion above and beyond valence. Results
indicated that the high arousal-PA condition experienced greater emotional arousal, joviality (a
high valence, high arousal emotion) and fear (a low valence, high arousal emotion), less serenity

28
(a high valence, low arousal emotion) and sadness (low valence and arousal) than the low arousal
PA condition. So, the high arousal PA condition experienced greater levels of emotions that
involve high arousal, with the exception of hostility. As predicted, these two conditions did not
experience differences in valence or hostility following the emotion regulation task.
Does Opposite Behavioral Change Sadness?
Comparing the high arousal-PA condition with the opposite action condition allows us to
better understand the impact of the behavioral component of opposite action on sadness when
manipulated in a laboratory setting. Contrary to predictions, opposite action condition
experienced lower post-regulation task valence and serenity and higher post-regulation task fear
in comparison to the high arousal-PA condition. Post-regulation task arousal, joviality, hostility
and sadness were not different for the high arousal-PA and opposite action conditions. This
suggests that the behavioral component in the Opposite Action task did not change sadness
above and beyond the affect of using opposite valence and arousal to change sadness. In fact the
task without the behavioral component (high arousal-PA condition) actually showed greater
success in increasing positive emotion (valence) than the same task with the behavioral
component and was no more effective in decreasing sadness than the same task with the
behavioral component. If this finding is generalizable and there are not moderators that explain
this relationship, this finding suggests that using opposite action (and potentially other emotion
regulation tasks with behavioral components) should be as (or less) effective as using skills less
difficult to implement, such as imagery (and potentially other emotion regulation skills with
cognitive and emotive components, but not a behavioral component). However, there are likely
reasons why differences in emotion across these 2 conditions following the emotion regulation
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task were not found, especially considering higher levels of post-regulation task fear for the
opposite action condition noted above.
Self report data demonstrate that people in the opposite action condition were less less
comfortable doing the emotion regulation task and experienced more fear following the emotion
regulation task than the other conditions. It could be that these two factors (greater fear and
discomfort due to the opposite action task than the other emotion regulation tasks) affected
engagement in the emotion regulation task as more people were excluded from the opposite
action condition (Nopposite action = 8) than the other conditions (3 people were excluded from the
control condition and 4 were excluded from the low and high arousal-PA conditions) due to lack
of self- and other reported engagement. Because participants in the opposite action condition
were asked to express excitement via physical behaviors (e.g. jumping up and down, waving
their hands in the air etc.) in front of research assistants they had never met before, participants
(especially those who might be more prone to social anxiety; Goldin, Manber, Hakimi, Canli &
Gross, 2009) likely experienced discomfort and fear due to the task, which may have in turn
influenced level of engagement with the task. However, I was unable to analyze whether
comfortability engaging in the emotion regulation tasks predicted emotion change from pre- to
post-regulation task because as a predictor, comfortability engaging in the emotion regulation
task would have needed to be collected prior to or at the same time as the outcome variable (i.e.
pre- to post-regulation task emotions). While efforts were made to increase comfortability
engaging in the opposite action task by having research assistants act out physical behaviors in
the guided movement task, participants in this condition were still less comfortable engaging in
the task.
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One question worth asking is, would the components of opposite action work differently
when working with a therapist after developing rapport in comparison to the environment where
the components were tested (in a laboratory with an unfamiliar research assistant)? Perhaps a
strong (therapeutic) rapport is necessary prior to introducing this skill to clients to cultivate
comfortability engaging in it. It may be that even in the context of a strong therapeutic
relationship, this skill elicits self-conciousness; however, it may increase sense of emotional
safety, which may be important. Future work should look at these components in the context of a
safe relationship or when in a setting where the task might be more comfortable to engage in.
Does Emotion Change Predict Mirror Tracing Task Persistence?
People begin tasks with pre-existing emotions, which likely shape subsequent behaviors
and approaches to tasks due to their associated action tendencies (e.g. some emotions facilitate
approach behaviors and others facilitate avoidance behaviors; Mehrabian & Russell, 1974;
Chong & Park, 2017; Frijda, 1986; Frijda, 1983), cognitive appraisal patterns (e.g. appraising the
task as something worth putting their resources toward, or appraising their own ability to succeed
in the task as sufficient or insufficient) and other characteristics of them (e.g. sadness tends to
slow down processing and increase analytical processing). We also know that emotions play a
role in motivation, information-processing and coping (e.g. Clore, 1992; Folkman & Lazarus,
1988; Schwarz, 1990); however, there is little research exploring the role of emotions in goaldirected behavior in much detail. With these ideas in mind, the mirror-tracing task was included
in the current study to understand whether emotion change as a result of our emotion regulation
tasks predict persistence on a distressing task requiring self-control. The task was also used to
help us understand whether specific task components influenced persistence on the task
differently.

31
I found that while pre-regulation task changes in valence, arousal, fear and joviality did
not predict mirror tracing task persistence, higher levels of pre-regulation task sadness and
serenity and lower levels of hostility did predict greater persistence on the mirror tracing task.
This suggests that using these skills when feeling some level of sadness, and serenity, but not
hostility has positive implications for one’s ability to persist through feelings of distress on a
challenging task.
Interestingly post-regulation task sadness predicted greater persistence on the mirror
tracing task, suggesting that when people feel more sad, they tend to persist for longer periods of
time on difficult tasks requiring distress tolerance. This is consistent with previous findings that
sadness facilitates analytical, bottom-up processing (Isabell, & Lair, 2013) and maintaining
negative emotional states (Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht & Koster, 2007). For example, Bertels,
Demoulin, Franco, Destrebecqz (2013) found people who were induced to feel sad (but not
angry) showed “increased conscious access” to newly acquired knowledge acquired from a
learning task.
There is also literature suggesting that when people are in negative emotional states, they
have more difficulties disengaging from related stimuli due to a negative attention bias. For
example, depressed participants consistently demonstrate more difficulties disengaging from
images of negative facial expressions than healthy controls (Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht &
Koster, 2007). Another study (Karparova, Kerstring & Suslow, 2005) found that depressed
individuals were better able to detect negative faces more quickly in a crowd than positive faces;
however, results did not support that depressed individuals experience greater difficulties
disengaging attention from facial emotion in the visual search task used in the study. To our
knowledge this phenomena has not been tested using other types of negative emotional stimuli,
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such as the mirror-tracing task. Perhaps people still feeling sad at the start of the mirror-tracing
task had greater difficulties disengaging from negative emotional stimuli provoked by the task.
Evidence that sadness prior to an emotionally challenging task predicted increased
persistence was accrued, which supports the idea that it is important to continue exploring the
role of emotion in tasks requiring self-control (e.g. can shifts in emotion improve these efforts,
which types of skills are best for various types of tasks etc.). Future studies should not only
continue exploring behavioral consequences of emotion regulation, but also why it is the case
that sadness predicted persistence on a distressing task. For example, what are the mechanisms
(e.g. cognitions, slower processing speed, difficulties disengaging from negatively valenced
stimuli etc.) by which sadness facilitates persistence on distressing tasks similar to the mirrortracing task.
The effect of post-regulation task emotions on mirror tracing persistence was not
different across conditions. In other words, emotion regulation components associated with each
task did not influence mirror-tracing persistence. It is possible that using a stronger manipulation
would have lead to different results or it could be that specific emotion regulation components
dismantled in the current study (cognitive, emotive and behavioral) do not have differential
effects on this type of task.
True self-regulation task paradigms ask participants to engage in tasks requiring selfregulation that one identifies with. It is ideal for self-regulation tasks to be consistent with
participant goals and values to ensure that they are invested in the self-regulation task (i.e.
recruiting dieters trying to reduce sugar intake, presenting them with sugary foods and assessing
the number of cookies eaten); however, in the current study participants were given the goal of
persisting on the mirror-tracing task and we cannot know whether or not they possessed an
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intrinsic goal to persist on the task. In other words, it is unknown whether people were invested
in applying self-regulation resources to persist on the task and therefore cannot consider the task
a true self-regulation task. Participant goals may have been contrary to persisting on the mirrortracing task. For example, some participants may have had a goal to finish the task quickly so
they could leave. Future studies should use address this limitation by including a task known to
be consistent with the participant’s goals and values.
Another limitation in using the mirror-tracing task is that people who did not quit the 5minute long mirror-tracing task did not have a quit score and therefore cannot be used to analyze
mirror tracing task persistence. This limited participants who had the strongest ability to persist
on the mirror-tracing task to influence study outcomes.
Our samples size was also not large enough to enable analyses looking at the effect of
individual differences on mirror-tracing task persistence across conditions. While a relatively
large sample was recruited, future research should recruit an even larger sample to address
related questions.
Do Individual Differences Predict Emotion Change Due to the Emotion Regulation Task?
I wanted to understand whether depressive symptoms and difficulties regulating emotion
interacted with condition to predict post-regulation task emotions. I found that higher depressive
symptoms over the past 2 weeks predicted less emotion change for the control and low arousalPA condition’s as a result of the emotion regulation tasks. Interestingly, the effect was strongest
for the control condition and depression did not predict post-regulation sadness for the high
arousal-PA and opposite action tasks. This is interesting because the conditions unaffected by
depressive symptoms included emotion regulation task with more pathways for changing
emotion (opposite valence, opposite arousal, mental imagery and the opposite action condition
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also included a behavioral component). It seems that people with more depressive difficulties
might benefit most from engaging in emotion regulation skills with a greater number of
components utilized to change emotion. It might be that the high arousal-PA and opposite action
tasks were more stimulating (as they used opposite arousal or both opposite arousal and physical
behaviors) and that this factor was especially important for people experiencing greater levels of
depressive symptoms. For example, behavioral activation is an empirically supported and highly
effective treatment for depression that requires that people increase their engagement in certain
activities that they likely began withdrawing from over the course of depression. Behavioral
activation likely increases stimulation for depressed individuals because they are now engaging
in more activities and they are using more pathways to improve their mood, which is likely also
true for the high arousal-PA and opposite action tasks in the current study.
Conclusions
The current study sought to understand the effectiveness cognitive, behavioral and emotive
components of a commonly used emotion regulation skill. Results suggested that using opposite
emotion (both opposite valence and arousal) works to change sadness; however, the action
component of the skill did not make the skill anymore effective. In fact people in the opposite
action condition were less comfortable engaging in the task than any other condition, which
likely mitigated the effectiveness of the opposite action task. These findings are important
because they can inform when and how to use the skill in clinical settings. For example, perhaps
this skill is most effective when introducing the skill once rapport and sense of safety has
developed in the therapeutic relationship. Two questions the current study begs are 1) was the
skilled really tested in the way it is used in treatment? and 2) is the context of a therapeutic
relationship necessary for the behavioral component to increase the effectiveness of the skill? It
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is still unknown whether the action component works in a therapeutic context. It may be that in a
therapeutic context, the physical actions are pathways to the generation of opposite emotion. On
the other hand, it may be that using other pathways (cognitive and emotive) is more effective. In
sum, further exploration as to whether, how and when the physical action component of opposite
action might increase effectiveness and if not, whether there are more practical emotion
regulation skills to use (e.g. imagery) is needed.
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Appendix
Tables
Table 1. Opposite action plus positive imagery and imagery scenarios
Control condition
Alarm Clock: You wake up
to the sound of your alarm
clock and notice the sound of
the loud beeps carrying
across your room. After
about 15 seconds you reach
over to your nightstand, turn
off the alarm and pick up
your phone. You notice a
notification that you have 2
new emails. You swing your
legs over the edge of the bed
and put your feet on the
ground. You can feel the
carpet on your feet and the
cool air on your arms and
face. You walk to the
bathroom, get your toothbrush ready and begin
brushing your teeth. You
notice the minty smell and
tingling sensation in your
mouth. You rinse your
toothbrush off, noticing the
sound of the water rushing
out of the faucet and walk to
the kitchen for breakfast.
Grocery store: As you
notice the grocery store sign
ahead while driving home,
you remember you need milk
and cereal. After pulling into
a parking lot and parking
your car, you remove the key
from the ignition and hear the

Low arousal imagery
condition
Lake/nature walk: After
getting a good night’s sleep,
you go for a leisurely stroll at
sunrise along the tree-lined
lake behind your house. You
hear birds happily chirping as
you walk towards the goldenblue sky. You see a mother
squirrel and its young
scamper up the tree in front of
you. Pausing, you take a
long, slow, deep breath
feeling the cool, crisp air in
your lungs, while admiring
the snow-capped mountains
beyond. You look towards the
still, blue lake feeling one
with nature. You’re flushed
with the feelings of warmth
and gladness, thankful for a
new day.

Opposite action and high
arousal imagery condition
Winning the lottery: You
bought 10 tickets for the
powerball lottery with high
hopes of winning
$1,000,000. Drawing day has
arrived and you are sitting in
front of the TV. The first 4
numbers have been called
out and they match with your
lottery ticket. You’re sitting
on the edge of your seat
gasping excitedly as you wait
for the last number to be
called. The last number is
called and it matches your
ticket! You begin jumping up
and down waving your ticket
back and forth while yelling
out “I won, I won, I won!”

Cozy night: You take a seat
on your cozy sofa next to one
of you closest friends.
Sipping your favorite
beverage, you engage in quiet
conversation. In your
peripheral vision, you see the
orange glow of the fire and

Sports game (favorite team
wins): You are a die-hard
sports fan for a particular
basketball team. Your team
has made it to the
championships and you are
seated in the first row
cheering on your team. Your
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Control condition

Low arousal imagery
condition
engine turn off. You shut the feel its warmth. The dim
door locking the car and you lighting and aroma of the lit
hear the sound of the car
candles soothe your senses,
door shutting. Once in the
accentuating the relaxed
store, you grab your grocery mood. The pleasant
cart and begin moving
background music
toward the milk isle. You can compliments the
hear the sound of the wheels conversation. You turn to
rolling on the floor and the
look through the window at
beeps at the cash register.
the falling snow onto the
You grab your milk, feeling a white, fluffy landscape, as
cold sensation on your hand
you snuggle deeper into the
and move to the cereal isle.
comfort of your soft blanket.
After selecting your cereal at
the breakfast isle, you place
your cereal in the cart and
begin walking to the cash
register.

Opposite action and high
arousal imagery condition
team has the ball, takes it
down the court. He shoots,
he SCORES! You begin
jumping up and down and
give your friend seated
beside you a high five. Now
the score is tied, with 10
seconds left in the game. The
other team rebounded and
race to their side of the court
with the ball. It is the last 5
seconds of the game. He
shoots, he MISSES! Your
team WON! You begin
jumping up and down and
pumping your fists with
excitement! You chest bump
your friend seated by you,
smiling ear to ear.
Lunch: Its lunch-time and
Beach: You step out on the
Graduation: You have
you just finished writing your beach feeling the sand
worked hard for the past four
last sentence for an
between your toes and the
years and you are finally
assignment. You set down
moist breeze on your face.
graduating from college.
your pen, grab your wallet
You see the sun’s gleaming
Your family is in the
and walk toward the exit.
reflection on the water and
audience watching proudly.
You open the door to your
notice a dolphin surfing in a
Your name is called, and you
building and begin walking
wave. A short way down the
begin making your way to
toward the street. You can
beach you hear the laughter of the podium with a large
hear the sounds of cars
children splashing in the
smile on your face. You
driving on the pavement and shore. As you walk toward
shake the chair of the
see the colors of street-lights the sound, you pick up shiny
department’s hand, and see
changing from green to red.
shells on the wet sand, and
your family standing
You walk-into the sandwich
watch a pelican diving for the watching. You smile proudly
shop noticing the sound of a
perfect meal. The smell of
and have an upright posture,
chime as you open the
the salty air and sound of the
then sprint to the steps
door. You step toward the
crashing waves are both
leaping off the stage with
cashier who asks you for
refreshing and soothing.
your arms in the air yelling
your order, and you tell him
“Wooo-hoooo!!!!” Once
that you will have a chicken
landed, you pull your
sandwich and
confetti gun from your
lemonade. You open your
pocket, then shoot confetti
wallet and take a ten-dollar
into the air yelling
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Control condition
ten-dollar bill and hand it to
the cashier. The cashier hands
you a your lemonade and you
feel the cold and moist cup on
your hands.

Low
arousal
condition

imagery Opposite action and high
arousal imagery condition
“Yeeeaaahhh!!!” The crowd
roars! You walk away feeling
elated throwing your cap in the
air!
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Table 2. Pre- to post-regulation task emotions and mirror tracing task correlations and descriptive statistics. Asterisks denote
statistically significant differences between groups at the p < .05 (*) and p < .01 (**) level.
(1)
1.

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

(13)

(14)

M (SD)

--

2.

MTT
Persistence
T2 Fear

.05

--

3.

T2 Sadness

.16

.41**

--

4.

.12
.04

.41**

.50**

--

.001

-.08

-.03

--

.13

-.27**

-.17*

-.03

.53**

--

.01

-.32**

-.47**

-.43**

.36**

.36**

--

8.

T2
Hostility
T2
Joviality
T2
Serenity
T2
Valence
T2 Arousal

.01

.11

-.09

.02

.06

-.02

.05

--

9.

T3 Fear

.34**

.30**

.33**

-.01

-.12

-.07

.11

--

10
.
11
.
12
.
13
.
14
.
15
.

T3 Sadness

.04
.16

.34**

.50**

.37**

.11

.03

-.22**

.03

.26**

--

.08
.11

.19*

.20*

.51**

.07

.01

-.13

.09

.34**

.48**

--

.25**

.35**

.29**

.27**

.12

-.10

.04
.05

.21*

-.11

-.12

--

-.28**

.12

-.08

.06

--

-.18*

-.32**

.42**

.24**

--

6.87 (1.64)

.34**

-.28**

.38**
-.10

.52**

-.38**

.13

5.0 (2.12)

5.
6.
7.

T3
Hostility
T3
Joviality
T3
Serenity
T3
Valence
T3 Arousal

76.74
(69.57)
1.46(.57)
2.59 (.81)
1.53 (.62)
1.34(.48)
2.44 (.99)

.01
.01

-.06

.15

-.01

.26**

.39**

.11

.08

.06

-.02

-.13

-.07

-.04

.08

.08

.002

-.02

-.04

-.16

-.02

3.09 (1.47)

.12
.13

4.08 (1.60)
1.25 (3.80)
1.32 (.51)
1.11 (.34)
2.64 (1.09)
3.23 (1.13)
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Table 3. Moderated regressions conducted in PROCESS v 3.0 (Hayes, 2017), with either DASS21 or S-DERS as the predictor variable, dummy coded condition (with control as the reference
variable) as the moderator, and post-induction emotion (T2) as a covariate.

Outcome

Predictor

Main Effect
Predictor
B (SE), p

Post ER task
Valence

Depression

-.04 (.03), p = .11

R∆2 = .009, F(3, 162) = .56, p = .64

DERS

-.40 (.40), p = .32

R∆2 = .04, F(3, 162) = 2.16, p = .09

Depression

-.04(.03), p =.14

R∆2 = .008, F(3, 162) = .66, p = .58

DERS

-.44 (.44), p = .31
-.005 (.02), p =
.70
.04 (.24), p = .87
.002 (.01), p = .87
.12 (.20), p = .55
.005 (.006), p =
.39
.005 (.09), p = .95
-.001 (.005), p =
.81
-.06 (.07), p = .37
.04 (.005), p <
.001
.27 (.10), p < .01

R∆2 = .01, F(3, 162) = .99, p = .40

Post ER task
Valence
Arousal
Joviality

Depression

Serenity

DERS
Depression
DERS

Fear

Depression
DERS

Hostility

Depression
DERS

Sadness

Depression
DERS

Variance accounted for by predictor x
condition (dummy coded)

R∆2 = .001, F(3, 163) = .07, p = .97
R∆2 = .03, F(3, 163) = 2.04, p = .11
R∆2 = . 01, F(3, 163) = 1.54, p = .21
R∆2 = .01, F(3, 163) = 1.25, p = .29
R∆2 = .002, F(3, 163) = .13, p = .94
R∆2 = .009, F(3, 163) = .71, p = .54
R∆2 = .02, F(3, 163) = 1.25, p = .29
R∆2 = .04, F(3, 163) = 3.48, p = .02
R∆2 = .09, F(3, 163) = 9.78, p < .001
R∆2 = .02, F(3, 163) = 1.87, p = .14
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Figures

Figure 1. Russell’s (2003) circumplex model of affect. A plot of emotions along two dimensions
(valence and arousal), where the basic emotions tend to form a circle. Within this framework, each
emotion has a corresponding opposite emotion, which is opposite in both valence and arousal.
Figure taken from Posner, Russell and Peterson, 2005.
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Figure 2. Study timeline.
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Figure 3. Emotional valence and arousal scores before and after completing the sadness induction.
All changes from baseline to post-induction are statistically significant (see text).
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Figure 4. Specific emotional states before and after completing the sadness induction. All
changes from baseline to post-induction are statistically significant (see text).
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Figure 5. Post-regulation task emotional Valence and Arousal scores across conditions. Asterisks
denote statistically significant differences between groups (see text).
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Figure 6. Post-regulation task specific emotions across conditions. Asterisks denote statistically
significant differences between groups (see text).
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Figure 7. Vividness of mental imagery and comfortability engaging in emotion regulation tasks
across conditions.
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Figure 8. Effect of depression by condition interaction on post-regulation task sadness when
controlling for pre-regulation task sadness across conditions.
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Measures
Manipulation Check Questions
Please read each statement and write the number 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 that indicates your experience
with the task. There are no right or wrong answers.
1
Extremely
Unpleasant

2
Somewhat
unpleasant

3
Neither pleasant
or unpleasant

4
Somewhat
pleasant

5
Extremely
unpleasant

___ 1. How pleasant was scenario 1/writing about you’re morning yesterday?
___ 2. How pleasant was scenario 2/writing about you’re afternoon yesterday?
___ 3. How pleasant was scenario 3/writing about you’re evening yesterday?
1
Not vivid at all

2
Slightly vivid

3
Somewhat vivid

4
5
Moderately vivid Extremely vivid

___ 4. How vividly did you imagine scenario 1/you’re morning yesterday?
___ 5. How vividly did you imagine scenario 2/you’re afternoon yesterday?
___ 6. How vividly did you imagine scenario 3/you’re evening yesterday?
1
Completely
disengaged

2
Somewhat
disengaged

3
Neither engaged
nor disengaged

4
Somewhat
engaged

5
Completely
engaged

___ 7. How engaged they were in the task?
Please circle one:
___ 8. Were you able to maintain imagery for the duration of the task (yes/no)
___ 9. Were you able to carry out the task at hand for the duration of the task (yes/no)
1
Extremely
uncomfortable

2
Somewhat
uncomfortable

3
Neither
comfortable nor
uncomfortable

___ 10. How comfortable were you in completing the task?

4
Somewhat
comfortable

5
Extremely
comfortable
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Emotional Valence and Arousal: Affect Grid
Please rate how you are feeling right now.

Depression and Anxiety: DASS-21
Please read each statement and circle a number 0, 1, 2 or 3 that indicates how much the statement
applied to you over the past week. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much
time on any statement.
0
Didn't apply to me
at all

1
Applied to me some
degree or some of the
time

2
Applied to me to a
considerable degree
or a good part of
time

3
Applied to me very
much, or most of the
time

1

I found it hard to wind down

0

1

2

3

2

I was aware of dryness of my mouth

0

1

2

3

3

I couldn't seem to experience any positive feeling at all

0

1

2

3
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4

I experienced breathing difficulty (eg, excessively rapid breathing,
breathlessness in the absence of physical exertion)

0

1

2

3

5

I found it difficult to work up the initiative to do things

0

1

2

3

6

I tended to over-react to situations

0

1

2

3

7

I experienced trembling (eg, in the hands)

0

1

2

3

8

I felt that I was using a lot of nervous energy

0

1

2

3

9

I was worried about situations in which I might panic and make
a fool of myself

0

1

2

3

10

I felt that I had nothing to look forward to

0

1

2

3

11

I found myself getting agitated

0

1

2

3

12

I found it difficult to relax

0

1

2

3

13

I felt down-hearted and blue

0

1

2

3

14

I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting on with
what I was doing

0

1

2

3

15

I felt I was close to panic

0

1

2

3

16

I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything

0

1

2

3

17

I felt I wasn't worth much as a person

0

1

2

3

18

I felt that I was rather touchy

0

1

2

3

19

I was aware of the action of my heart in the absence of physical
exertion (e.g., sense of heart rate increase, heart missing a beat)

0

1

2

3

20
21

I felt scared without any good reason
I felt that life was meaningless

0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

Emotion Regulation: DERS
On a regular basis, how often does each item apply to you:
1
Almost Never
(0-10%)

2
Sometimes
(11-35%)

3
About half the
time (36-65%)

4
Most of the time
(66-90%)

______ 1.

I am clear about my feelings.

______ 2.

I pay attention to how I feel

______ 3.

I experience my emotions as overwhelming and out of control.

5
Almost Always
(91-100%)
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______ 4.

I have no idea how I am feeling.

______ 5.

I have difficulty making sense out of my feelings.

______ 6.

I am attentive to my feelings.

______ 7.

I know exactly how I am feeling.

______ 8.

I care about what I am feeling.

______ 9.

I am confused about how I feel.

______ 10.

When I’m upset, I acknowledge my emotions.

______ 11.

When I’m upset, I become angry with myself for feeling that way.

______ 12.

When I’m upset, I become embarrassed for feeling that way.

______ 13.

When I’m upset, I have difficulty getting work done.

______ 14.

When I’m upset, I become out of control.

______ 15.

When I’m upset, I believe that I will remain that way for a long time.

______ 16.

When I’m upset, I believe that I’ll end up feeling very depressed.

______ 17.

When I’m upset, I believe that my feelings are valid and important.

______ 18.

When I’m upset, I have difficulty focusing on other things.

______ 19.

When I’m upset, I feel out of control.

______ 20.

When I’m upset, I can still get things done.

______ 21.

When I’m upset, I feel ashamed with myself for feeling that way.

______ 22.

When I’m upset, I know that I can find a way to eventually feel better.

______ 23.

When I’m upset, I feel like I am weak.

______ 24.

When I’m upset, I feel like I can remain in control of behaviors.

______ 25.

When I’m upset, I feel guilty for feeling that way.

______ 26.

When I’m upset, I have difficulty concentrating.

______ 27.

When I’m upset, I have difficulty controlling my behaviors.

______ 28.

When I’m upset, I believe there is nothing I can do to make myself feel better

______ 29.

When I’m upset, I become irritated with myself for feeling that way

______ 30.

When I’m upset, I start to feel very bad about myself

______ 31.

When I’m upset, I believe that wallowing in it is all I can do

______ 32.

When I’m upset, I lose control over my behaviors

______ 33.

When I’m upset, I have difficulty thinking about anything else

______ 34.

When I’m upset, I take time to figure out what I’m really feeling
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______ 35.

When I’m upset, it takes me a long time to feel better

______ 36.

When I’m upset, my emotions feel overwhelming

Distress Tolerance: DTS.
Please indicate the level to which you agree with each of the following statements.
1

2

3

4

5

Strongly
agree

Mildly agree

Agree and
disagree equally

Mildly disagree

Strongly disagree

___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___
___

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

___
___
___
___
___
___

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Feeling distressed of upset is unbearable to me.
When I feel distressed or upset, all I can think about is how bad I feel.
I can’t handle feeling distressed or upset.
My feelings of distress are so intense that they completely take over.
There’s nothing worse than feeling distressed or upset.
I can tolerate being distressed or upset as well as most people.
My feelings of distress or being upset are not acceptable.
I’ll do anything to avoid feeling distress or upset.
Other people seem to be able to tolerate feeling distressed or upset better than I
can.
Being distressed or upset is always a major ordeal for me.
I am ashamed of myself when I feel distressed or upset.
My feelings of distress or being upset scare me.
I’ll do anything to stop feeling distressed or upset.
When I feel distressed or upset, I must do something about it immediately.
When I feel distressed or upset, I cannot help but concentrate on how bad the
distress actually feels.

Emotion Reactivity: ERS
This questionnaire asks different questions about how you experience emotions on a regular
basis. When you are asked about being ‘emotional,’ this may refer to being angry, sad, excited,
or some other emotion. Please rate the following statements.
0
1
Not at all like A little like me
me
_________ 1.
_________ 2.
_________ 3.

2
Somewhat like
me

3
A lot
like me

4
Completely
like me

When something happens that upsets me, it’s all I can think about it for
a long time.
My feelings get hurt easily.
When I experience emotions, I feel them very strongly/intensely.
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_________ 4.
_________ 5.
_________ 6.
_________ 7.
8.
_________
_________ 9.
_________ 10.
_________ 11.
_________
_________
_________
_________
_________

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

_________
_________
_________
_________
_________

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

When I’m emotionally upset, my whole body gets physically upset as
well.
I tend to get very emotional very easily.
I experience emotions very strongly.
I often feel extremely anxious.
When I feel emotional, it's hard for me to imagine feeling any other
way.
Even the littlest things make me emotional.
If I have a disagreement with someone, it takes a long time for me to
get over it.
When I am angry/upset, it takes me much longer than most people to
calm down.
I get angry at people very easily.
I am often bothered by things that other people don’t react to.
I am easily agitated.
My emotions go from neutral to extreme in an instant.
When something bad happens, my mood changes very quickly. People
tell me I have a very short fuse.
People tell me that my emotions are often too intense for the situation.
I am a very sensitive person.
My moods are very strong and powerful.
I often get so upset it’s hard for me to think straight.
Other people tell me I'm overreacting.

Positive and Negative Affect: PANAS
This scale consists of a number of words that describe feelings and emotions. Read each item
and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that word. Indicate to what extent you
feel this way in general, that is, MOST OF THE TIME. Use the following scale to record your
answers.
1
2
3
4
5
very slightly

a little

moderately

quite a bit

or not at all

______

interested

______

irritable

______

distressed

______

alert

______

excited

______

ashamed

______

upset

______

inspired

______

strong

______

nervous

extremely
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______

guilty

______

determined

______

scared

______

attentive

______

hostile

______

jittery

______

enthusiastic

______

active

______

proud

______

afraid

Positive and Negative Affect: PANAS-X
This scale consists of a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to the word.
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now. Use the following scale to record your
answers:
1
Very slightly or
not at all
_____afraid
_____excited
_____loathing
_____cheerful
_____sad
_____calm
_____downhearted

2
A little
_____energetic
_____scornful
_____joyful
_____irritable
_____shaky
_____blue
_____happy

3
Moderately

4
Quite a bit

_____lonely
_____frightened
_____lively
_____alone
_____delighted
_____relaxed
_____scared

5
Extremely

_____at ease
_____disgusted
_____nervous
_____angry
_____jittery
_____enthusiastic
_____hostile

